On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them
proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the
dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities.
These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes
by which the component parts were pressed together were much more
numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful
ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head,
and to each other.
In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified.
Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between
the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances
between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that
the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had
no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and
particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the
people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as
many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.
The State governments will have the advantage of the Federal government,
whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the
one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side
will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the
predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and
faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.
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