The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the
federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation
of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to
such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire
a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that
it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be
supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally
misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this
important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which
the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of
power should be separate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the
celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable
precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of
displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of
mankind.
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