One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he
appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of
power against the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps altogether his
own, and as it immediately relates to the subject of our present
inquiry, ought not to be overlooked.
His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three branches of
government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds of
their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the
constitution, or CORRECTING BREACHES OF IT, a convention shall be called
for the purpose."
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from
them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches
of government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant
to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not
only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the
powers of the government, but also whenever any one of the departments
may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The
several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their
common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an
exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their
respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be
prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an
appeal to the people themselves, who, as the grantors of the
commissions, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its
observance?
There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed
to prove that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought
to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary
occasions.
Pages:
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522