Notwithstanding the success which has attended the
revisions of our established forms of government, and which does so much
honor to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America, it must
be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be
unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect that all the existing
constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the
passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an enthusiastic
confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the
ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions; of a
universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal
resentment and indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no
spirit of party connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to
be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future
situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present
any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.
But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would
probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of
maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government.
Pages:
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525