Its propriety rests
upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT
TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION. Every just
reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in the
work of the convention; and will disapprove every deviation from it
which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of
incorporating into the work some particular ingredient, with which a
rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though
he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and
to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a portion of
imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness,
and perhaps anarchy.
It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and
inserted in the Constitution, which would have been always applicable to
every probable change in the situation of the country; and it will
therefore not be denied, that a discretionary power over elections ought
to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded, that
there were only three ways in which this power could have been
reasonably modified and disposed: that it must either have been lodged
wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures,
or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former.
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