As an objection to this position, it may be remarked that the
constitution of the national Senate would involve, in its full extent,
the danger which it is suggested might flow from an exclusive power in
the State legislatures to regulate the federal elections. It may be
alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators, they might at
any time give a fatal blow to the Union; and from this it may be
inferred, that as its existence would be thus rendered dependent upon
them in so essential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting
them with it in the particular case under consideration. The interest of
each State, it may be added, to maintain its representation in the
national councils, would be a complete security against an abuse of the
trust.
This argument, though specious, will not, upon examination, be found
solid. It is certainly true that the State legislatures, by forbearing
the appointment of senators, may destroy the national government. But it
will not follow that, because they have a power to do this in one
instance, they ought to have it in every other. There are cases in which
the pernicious tendency of such a power may be far more decisive,
without any motive equally cogent with that which must have regulated
the conduct of the convention in respect to the formation of the Senate,
to recommend their admission into the system.
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