So far the equality ought to be
no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are
not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an
improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of
the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper
acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority
of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on
legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial;
and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller
States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and
distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to
peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their
power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this
prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of
law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be
more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
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