Some governments
are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in
the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too
little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution
avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for
the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.
Fourth. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid
succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in
the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the
government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half
of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of
opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a
continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule
of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in
private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in
national transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a
volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a
source of innumerable others.
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