It is of much consequence
that this correspondence and conformity be carefully maintained; and
they who assent to the truth of this position will see and confess that
it is well provided for by making concurrence of the Senate necessary
both to treaties and to laws.
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature,
but that perfect SECRECY and immediate DESPATCH are sometimes requisite.
These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if
the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of
discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether
they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless
are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the
President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still
less in that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done well,
therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that
although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and
consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of
intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.
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