This was perhaps the prudent
mean. I forbear to remark upon the additional pretext for clamor against
the judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority
would have afforded.
Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of
impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of
the government? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in
favor of, such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial
objection, that it could tend to increase the complexity of the
political machine, and to add a new spring to the government, the
utility of which would at best be questionable. But an objection which
will not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this: a court
formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with a heavy expense,
or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and
inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary
at the seat of government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular
stipends, or of certain officers of the State governments to be called
upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending.
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