Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of
the Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an
appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire, and the
proofs of the want of it destroy.
A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of
impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in the power
of making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute the
senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious
execution of that trust. After having combined with the Executive in
betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous treaty, what
prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the
punishment they would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon
the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they have
been guilty?
This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and with
greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this
part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an
erroneous foundation.
The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption
and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the
numbers and characters of those who are to make them.
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