Where a man in any
station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new
President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a
person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance
of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of
discredit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a
steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which
connects the official existence of public men with the approbation or
disapprobation of that body which, from the greater permanency of its
own composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy
than any other member of the government.
To this union of the Senate with the President, in the article of
appointments, it has in some cases been suggested that it would serve to
give the President an undue influence over the Senate, and in others
that it would have an opposite tendency -- a strong proof that neither
suggestion is true.
To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It amounts to
this: the President would have an improper influence over the Senate,
because the Senate would have the power of restraining him.
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