If
by influencing the President be meant restraining him, this is precisely
what must have been intended. And it has been shown that the restraint
would be salutary, at the same time that it would not be such as to
destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency
of that Magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the [good,
without the ill.][E1] [good of that of appointment, and would in a great
measure avoid its evils.][E1]
Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of the officers of the
proposed government with that which is established by the constitution
of this State, a decided preference must be given to the former. In that
plan the power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the Executive.
And as there would be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the
judgment of an entire branch of the legislature, the circumstances
attending an appointment, from the mode of conducting it, would
naturally become matters of notoriety; and the public would be at no
loss to determine what part had been performed by the different actors.
The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and
absolutely.
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