The first
excludes, the last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of the State
tribunals; and as the first would amount to an alienation of State power
by implication, the last appears to me the most natural and the most
defensible construction.
But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable
to those descriptions of causes of which the State courts have previous
cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to cases which may
grow out of, and be peculiar to, the Constitution to be established; for
not to allow the State courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can
hardly be considered as the abridgment of a pre-existing authority. I
mean not therefore to contend that the United States, in the course of
legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not
commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to
the federal courts solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient;
but I hold that the State courts will be divested of no part of their
primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal; and I am
even of opinion that in every case in which they were not expressly
excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of
course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.
Pages:
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847