Qu. Whether there be not less security where there are more
temptations and fewer checks?
32. Qu. If a man is to risk his fortune, whether it be more prudent
to risk it on the credit of private men, or in that of the great
assembly of the nation?
33. Qu. Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual
dealing, whether in a secret impenetrable recess, where credit
depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and
inspected by Parliament?
34. Qu. Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether
numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not
increase the danger?
35. Qu. What real objection lies against a national bank erected by
the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed
and inspected by the legislature?
36. Qu. What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as
well feared without it?
37. Qu. How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become
an instrument of oppression?
38. Qu. Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we
are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person
at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or
whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the
demands upon it are unknown?
39. Qu. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a
concurrence of the government, be not very practicable?
40.
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