Priestley fancies himself to have proved
the Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot
want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his
argument is no more a truism. As a wish, that the Deity may not want
benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows
that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and
happiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence
is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant
than evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable
of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are
not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice,
happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions.
That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof
in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant,
that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof
neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet
Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is
unquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author
himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who
will pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile
conclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is
absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the
rest of the ecclesiastical arguers.
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