His conclusion of the argument is still more curious, "because
every thing was caused there must have been something that was not
caused." The cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. The effect
is not infinite. Why then attribute infinity to the cause? This is
Hume's argument. Priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher.
Let others judge! But surely, with all this infinity it may be asked,
why may not there have been an infinity of causes?
Another argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any
thing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that
invisible power is what he calls God. Apply this argument to gravity,
and the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is
God. But if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of
nature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible? Why necessary
to account at all for them? Or why may not visible things account for
them, although this person or another cannot tell which?
If nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material
nature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of Deities, than one
immediate Deity. An equality in a plurality of Deities might be
objectionable. But that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary;
and so was the Pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one.
This universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of
another, and so on.
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