But in the third
or fourth way he has made dependent on himself as well the mind as the
body of the other; yet only as long as the fear or hope lasts, for upon
the removal of the feeling the other is left independent.
11. The judgment can be dependent on another, only as far as that other
can deceive the mind; whence it follows that the mind is so far
independent, as it uses reason aright. Nay, inasmuch as human power is
to be reckoned less by physical vigour than by mental strength, it
follows that those men are most independent whose reason is strongest,
and who are most guided thereby. And so I am altogether for calling a
man so far free, as he is led by reason; because so far he is determined
to action by such causes, as can be adequately understood by his
unassisted nature, although by these causes he be necessarily determined
to action. For liberty, as we showed above (Sec. 7), does not take away
the necessity of acting, but supposes it.
12. The pledging of faith to any man, where one has but verbally
promised to do this or that, which one might rightfully leave undone, or
vice vers?, remains so long valid as the will of him that gave his word
remains unchanged. For he that has authority to break faith has, in
fact, bated nothing of his own right, but only made a present of words.
If, then, he, being by natural right judge in his own case, comes to the
conclusion, rightly or wrongly (for "to err is human"), that more harm
than profit will come of his promise, by the judgment of his own mind he
decides that the promise should be broken, and by natural right (Sec.
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