VI. Sec. 3), that, if
without destroying the form of dominion, the sword of the dictator might
be permanent, and only terrible to the wicked, evils will never grow to
such a pitch, that they cannot be eradicated or amended. In order,
therefore, to secure all these conditions, we have said, that there is
to be a council of syndics subordinate to the supreme council, to the
end that the sword of the dictator should be permanent in the hands not
of any natural person, but of a civil person, whose members are too
numerous to divide the dominion amongst themselves (Chap. IX. Secs. 1,
2), or to combine in any wickedness. To which is to be added, that they
are forbidden to fill any other office in the dominion, that they are
not the paymasters of the soldiery, and, lastly, that they are of an age
to prefer actual security to things new and perilous. Wherefore the
dominion is in no danger from them, and consequently they cannot, and in
fact will not be a terror to the good, but only to the wicked. For as
they are less powerful to accomplish criminal designs, so are they more
so to restrain wickedness. For, not to mention that they can resist it
in its beginnings (since the council lasts for ever), they are also
sufficiently numerous to dare to accuse and condemn this or that
influential man without fear of his enmity; especially as they vote by
ballot, and the sentence is pronounced in the name of the entire
council.
3. But the tribunes of the commons at Rome were likewise regularly
appointed; but they were too weak to restrain the power of a Scipio, and
had besides to submit to the senate their plans for the public welfare,
[3] which also frequently eluded them, by contriving that the one whom
the senators were least afraid of should be most popular with the
commons.
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