So long as we
confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or
criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and
experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions, and
remove, at least in part, the suspicion which we so justly
entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtle and
refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have not this
advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon objects,
which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of
all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension.
We are like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing
must seem suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of
transgressing against the laws and customs of the people with
whom they live and converse. We know not how far we ought to
trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject; since,
even in common life, and in that province which is peculiarly
appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are
entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing
them.
All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an
abstract view, it furnishes invincible arguments against itself;
and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance, on
any subject, were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and
subtle, that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and
more natural arguments derived from the senses and experience.
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