This species of scepticism is fatal to knowledge,
not to religion; since we find, that those who make greatest
profession of it, give often their assent, not only to the great
truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the most
absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to
them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not
believe nor attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But
the refined and philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence
of an opposite nature. They push their researches into the most
abstruse corners of science; and their assent attends them in
every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with.
They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most abstruse and
remote objects are those which are best explained by philosophy.
Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the heavenly
bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of
bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of
the parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics,
therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each
particular evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the
precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is their practice
in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And
why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why
must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the general
presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any
particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal
conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion?
Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding
erroneous; our ideas, even of the most familiar objects,
extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities and
contradictions.
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