For how can an
effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so;
how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? The unity
too of the Divine Nature, it is very difficult, if not absolutely
impossible, to deduce merely from contemplating the works of
nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the plan, even were it
allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. Whereas the
argument a priori ....
You seem to reason, D/EMEA\, interposed C/LEANTHES\, as if
those advantages and conveniences in the abstract argument were
full proofs of its solidity. But it is first proper, in my
opinion, to determine what argument of this nature you choose to
insist on; and we shall afterwards, from itself, better than from
its useful consequences, endeavour to determine what value we
ought to put upon it.
The argument, replied D/EMEA\, which I would insist on, is
the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of
its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to
produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting
up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in
tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at
all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that
is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is
absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession
of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist
by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately
preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken
together, is not determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is
evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any
particular object which begins to exist in time.
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