Nothing is demonstrable,
unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is
distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we
conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There
is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a
contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is
demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and
am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.
It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent
being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be
explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or
nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to
exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that
this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at
present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to
conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to
exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing
any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we
lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four.
The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or,
which is the same thing, none that is consistent.
But further, why may not the material universe be the
necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended
explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the
qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may
contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its
non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two
is five.
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