I find only one argument employed to prove, that the
material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this
argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and
the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said, "may
be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to
be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not
impossible."22 But it seems a great partiality not to perceive,
that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we
have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least
imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered.
It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make
his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes
unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities
may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and
inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it.
Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of
objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first
author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a
cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a
beginning of existence?
In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is
caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds
it. Where then is the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a
cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole,
like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom,
or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by
an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature
of things.
Pages:
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120