From
some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is
perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is
almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so
short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these
subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures
of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which
I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the
beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.
But I will be contented to retire still from this
entrenchment, for I deny that you can ever force me in it. I will
allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite
power and goodness in the Deity, even in your sense of these
attributes: What are you advanced by all these concessions? A
mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove
these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the
present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A
hopeful undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed,
yet being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose.
How much more, where they are also so jarring and discordant!
Here, C/LEANTHES\, I find myself at ease in my argument.
Here I triumph. Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural
attributes of intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical
and metaphysical subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of
the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the
beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such
irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe
they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then
imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on
them.
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