But as there are also
considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a
proportional difference in the causes; and in particular, ought
to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the
supreme cause, than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here
then the existence of a D/EITY\ is plainly ascertained by reason:
and if we make it a question, whether, on account of these
analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence,
notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be
supposed between him and human minds; what is this but a mere
verbal controversy? No man can deny the analogies between the
effects: To restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the
causes is scarcely possible. From this inquiry, the legitimate
conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy: And if we
are not contented with calling the first and supreme cause a
G/OD\ or D/EITY\, but desire to vary the expression; what can we
call him but /MIND\ or /THOUGHT\, to which he is justly supposed
to bear a considerable resemblance?
All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes,
which abound so much in philosophical and theological inquiries;
and it is found, that the only remedy for this abuse must arise
from clear definitions, from the precision of those ideas which
enter into any argument, and from the strict and uniform use of
those terms which are employed. But there is a species of
controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of human
ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any
precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable
certainty or precision.
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