That a victor in a hundred fights should in his hundred-and-first,
[Footnote:
"The painful warrior, famoused for fight,
After a thousand victories once foil'd,
Is from the book of honor razed quite,
And all the rest forgot for which he toil'd."
_Shakespeare's Sonnets._]
as in his first, risk the loss of that particular battle, is inseparable
from the condition of man, and the uncertainty of human means; but that
the loss of this one battle should be equally fatal and irrecoverable with
the loss of his first, that it should leave him with means no more
cemented, and resources no better matured for retarding his fall, and
throwing a long succession of hindrances in the way of his conqueror,
argues some essential defect of system. Under our modern policy, military
power--though it may be the growth of one man's life--soon takes root; a
succession of campaigns is required for its extirpation; and it revolves
backwards to its final extinction through all the stages by which
originally it grew. On the Roman system this was mainly impossible from
the solitariness of the Roman power; co-rival nations who might balance
the victorious party, there were absolutely none; and all the underlings
hastened to make their peace, whilst peace was yet open to them, on the
known terms of absolute treachery to their former master, and instant
surrender to the victor of the hour.
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