Upon such an insult, Alexander could not do less, with either
safety or dignity, than prepare for war. It is probable, indeed, that, by
this expedition, which drew off the minds of the soldiery from brooding
upon the reforms which offended them, the life of Alexander was prolonged.
But the expedition itself was mismanaged, or was unfortunate. This result,
however, does not seem chargeable upon Alexander. All the preparations
were admirable on the march, and up to the enemy's frontier. The invasion
it was, which, in a strategic sense, seems to have been ill combined.
Three armies were to have entered Persia simultaneously: one of these,
which was destined to act on a flank of the general line, entangled itself
in the marshy grounds near Babylon, and was cut off by the archery of an
enemy whom it could not reach. The other wing, acting upon ground
impracticable for the manoeuvres of the Persian cavalry, and supported by
Chosroes the king of Armenia, gave great trouble to Artaxerxes, and, with
adequate support from the other armies, would doubtless have been
victorious. But the central army, under the conduct of Alexander in
person, discouraged by the destruction of one entire wing, remained
stationary in Mesopotamia throughout the summer, and, at the close of the
campaign, was withdrawn to Antioch, _re infecta_.
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