Dioclesian was doubtless that man of iron whom the times demanded; and a
foreign writer has gone so far as to class him amongst the greatest of
men, if he were not even himself the greatest. But the position of
Dioclesian was remarkable beyond all precedent, and was alone sufficient
to prevent his being the greatest of men, by making it necessary that he
should be the most selfish. For the case stood thus: If Rome were in
danger, much more so was Caesar. If the condition of the empire were such
that hardly any energy or any foresight was adequate to its defence, for
the emperor, on the other hand, there was scarcely a possibility that he
should escape destruction. The chances were in an overbalance against the
empire; but for the emperor there was no chance at all. He shared in all
the hazards of the empire; and had others so peculiarly pointed at
himself, that his assassination was now become as much a matter of certain
calculation, as seed-time or harvest, summer or winter, or any other
revolution of the seasons. The problem, therefore, for Dioclesian was a
double one,--so to provide for the defence and maintenance of the empire,
as simultaneously (and, if possible, through the very same institution) to
provide for the personal security of Caesar.
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